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On a Taxonomy of Delegation
Quan Pham, Jason Reid, Adrian McCullagh and Ed Dawson
Abstract Delegation, from a technical point of view, is widely considered as a po-
tential approach in addressing the problem of providing dynamic access control
decisions in activities with a high level of collaboration, either within a single se-
curity domain or across multiple security domains. Although delegation continues
to attract significant attention from the research community, presently, there is no
published work that presents a taxonomy of delegation concepts and models. This
paper intends to address this gap.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, delegation may be used as a term for describing how duties and the
required authority propagate through an organisation. In technical settings, often the
term delegation is used to describe how an entity passes some specific capabilities
on to another entity. However, delegation in technical settings is an ill-defined con-
cept. Currently, there is no single study that provides a comprehensive taxonomy of
delegation concepts and models. Thus, there is a need for a taxonomy which acts
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as a conceptual framework to help researchers position their research. This paper
proposes a set of taxonomic criteria which can then be used to analyse a range of
delegation proposals and models. This paper also investigates a number of dele-
gation approaches from various perspectives such as actors, credentials, attributes,
protocols, etc. to characterise each approach.
In this paper, for purposes of precision and clarity, we adopt the terminology
used in the XACML specification. Attributes will be used to describe the following
information: group, role and other information which can be ascribed to a particular
entity. The entity that performs a delegation is referred to as a delegator and the
entity that receives a delegation is referred to as a delegatee. An attribute will be
said to be delegatable if it can be successfully granted from one entity to another.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a taxonomy for
delegation support in information systems. Section 3 discusses some notable works
and their characteristics in the field and maps them with the characteristics described
in the taxonomy. Section 4 discusses notable characteristics of these approaches
and future trends in development of the delegation concept. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 A Taxonomy
This paper is concerned with the implementation of the delegation concept in tech-
nical settings. This paper considers delegation as a proxy process in which one entity
grants/allocates the necessary attributes to another entity to enable the receiver to
be able to perform certain responsibilities or capabilities while meeting certain obli-
gations and constraints (e.g. with respect to duration, frequency etc.). A delegation
process usually includes a mechanism to revoke the delegated attributes (revoca-
tion). This section discusses in detail each dimension of the taxonomy which are
summarised in Table 1.
Motivation Depending on the type of the operational environment, there may be
different factors motivating delegation between the entities. From a technical point
of view, these include:
• Lack of authorisation An entity does not have sufficient authorisation to perform
certain actions over certain resources to complete a task.
• Lack of or conflicted policies Policies required to achieve a certain goal may
conflict and the entity involved with the activities may need to delegate the tasks
to another entity which is not affected by the conflicted policies.
Delegation Boundary The delegation can happen within a single security domain,
or across multiple security domains. Delegation within a single security domain is
the simplest case and is relatively easy to manage because of the centralised stor-
age of policies and credentials. Until recently, most proposals restrict their scope to
delegation within a single security domain. As the issues of security for collabora-
tive environments have emerged, the concept of delegation needs to be considered
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Table 1 Characteristics of Delegation
Characteristic Factor
Motivation - Lack of Authorisation
- Lack of or Conflicted Policies
Delegation Boundary - Within a security domain
- Across multiple security domains
Who requests delegation? - User
- System Authority
Who delegates? - User (Ad-hoc)
- System Authority (Administrative)
Relationship of the parties - Direct
- Indirect
What to delegate? - Capability
- Responsibility
How much to delegate? - Partial
- Total
How long to delegate? - Temporal
- Permanent
How to delegate? - Transfer
- Grant
Authority Pre-Approval - Yes
- No (Optimistic Delegation)
Type of Credential - X.509
- SAML Assertion
- Generic Token
Key Scheme - Symmetric Key
- Asymmetric Key
Where delegation happens? - User Level (Application)
- System Level
Where is delegation honoured? - Access Decision Point
- An additional authority for delegation
from a new angle: delegation across multiple security domains, e.g. an entity from
one system can delegate to another entity on another system. Cross domain delega-
tion can bring flexibility to collaborative activities and can meet the needs of such
dynamic environments [10]. However, cross domain delegation must cope with the
complexity in building delegation protocols and exchanging/validating delegation
tokens due to the potential inconsistency of security approaches by different sys-
tems.
Who requests delegation? As the motivations discussed above can happen with
both normal users and the system authority, delegation can be requested by either
a user or a system authority. Delegation requested by users is common. Consider
for example, when a CEO employs a company secretary, he will want to allocate
certain duties to the company secretary, for example, preparing the annual financial
report. In a sense, this is the allocation of responsibility (a granting process) from
the CEO to the company secretary. In contrast, delegation from the system authority
is considered as a special case. The delegation of system authority is fixed and to
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some extent, well pre-defined by the organisation’s policies and procedures. In this
type of delegation, the system authority actually does not request the delegation for
itself; in fact, it requests the delegation on behalf of the delegator and the delegatee.
Who delegates? (Who is the delegator?) The delegator can be a user (ad-hoc),
or system authority (administrative). Schaad argued that user ad-hoc delegation and
administrative delegation can be differentiated based on three factors [11]: the rep-
resentation of the authority to delegate, the specific relation of the delegator to the
delegated attributes, and the duration of the delegation (how long the delegated at-
tributes can last?)
Administrative delegation is the basic form of delegation in which an administra-
tor or system authority assigns attributes and privileges to enable users to conduct
certain tasks. This process typically happens when a user joins a security domain.
The delegator, in this case, represents the authority of the system (system admin-
istration). In user delegation, the delegator is a normal user. So the delegator rep-
resents the authority of the user only. This is the case in which a user grants or
transfers the whole or a subset of his/her attributes to other users. As the user is
the delegator, the user must possess the ability to utilise the attributes to be able to
perform delegation. This type of delegation is typically short-lived and intended for
a specific purpose [6, 11].
Relationship of the parties in the delegation process The relationship between
the delegator and the delegatee can be considered as either direct delegation or in-
direct delegation (sub-delegation). Direct delegation is defined as the delegation in
which the delegator directly sends the delegation assertion to the delegatee. In con-
trast, indirect delegation is performed with the involvement of one or many inter-
mediate parties which can forward the delegation assertion from the delegator to the
delegatee. This type of delegation is sometimes called sub-delegation. Indirect dele-
gation is mainly performed to achieve a multi-step delegation. Indirect delegation is
especially important in the context of cross domain delegation when the delegation
token traverses various security domains.
What to delegate? What to delegate is the main and the most controversial topic
in the field. The object of the delegation process is a key aspect on which proposed
models differ. The following three main cases are evident in published proposals:
• Case 1: The delegatee takes on attributes of another entity (the delegator) via an
unforgeable token which has the capability to perform the task.
• Case 2: The delegatee is assigned some attributes that the authority will evaluate
in the context of a set of applicable policies. The difference to Case 1 is that
the delegated attributes are considered as new attributes of the delegatee while in
Case 1, the delegated attributes are treated as if they are from the delegator.
• Case 3: The delegatee is assigned new responsibilities as part of the delegation
commitment between the involved parties or part of the constraints set by the
applicable policies. It is very often that the attribute that represents new respon-
sibility is “role”. This case, however, more precisely reflects the social nature of
the delegation concept.
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To stimulate the above cases, at the abstract level, there are two trends:
• Delegation of Capability: Case 1 and Case 2 represent a type of delegation of
capability as the delegation will enable new capability in the delegatee. In this
paper, the term capability is used in the sense which it is defined in POSIX Draft
1003.1e/2c as simply a representation of the ability to perform a specified task.
• Delegation of Responsibility (Case 3): It is a form of transferring tasks as well
as obligations/conditions or commitments which are associated and covered by
certain responsibilities from one entity to another [1, 7].
In general, delegation of capability is technically well defined. This type of del-
egation is defined to cope with the demand for a high level of granularity and is
appropriate for environments which require a high level of flexibility. However, del-
egation of responsibility is considered as a broader concept compared to delegation
of capability. From the responsibility perspective, the process is defined via the re-
sponsibility to transfer or grant and it is assumed that necessary attributes or rules
to complete the duties will be transferred or granted upon completing the process.
The associated obligations/conditions or commitments are considered as part of the
delegation process.
How much to delegate? In general, depending on the needs of the delegator and
delegatee, the delegation can be partial or total delegation. Partial delegation can
be achieved by delegating just a specific subset of capabilities/responsibilities. On
the other hand, total delegation can be achieved by delegating the whole set of ca-
pabilities/responsibilities associated with certain attributes. Total delegation is the
extreme case. In fact, the concepts of partial and total delegation are quite relative.
How long to delegate? Delegation can be temporal or permanent. Temporal dele-
gation is a time-constrained delegation of which the validity period is set by either
the delegator or the system authority. On the other hand, permanent delegation is a
type of delegation which does not need a specified expiry time. The delegation and
revocation process is triggered by a specified event. This type of delegation can be
considered as relatively permanent. Permanent delegation is usually associated with
administrative delegation due to the nature of the relationship of the delegator and
the delegatee and the organisation’s policies. In ad-hoc delegation, permanent dele-
gation is rare and is usually considered as a failure of the system to reflect a change
in circumstances.
How to delegate? From the operational perspective, delegation may be classified
into two categories: grant delegation or transfer delegation [6]. In grant delegation,
a successful delegation operation allows a delegated attribute to be available to both
the delegator and delegatee. So after a grant delegation, both delegatee and delega-
tor will share some common attributes. Grant delegation makes the availability of
attributes increase monotonically with delegations [6]. Grant delegation is primarily
concerned with allowing the delegatee to use the delegated attributes. On the other
hand, in transfer delegation, besides allowing the delegatee to use the delegated at-
tributes, the mechanism must be able to prevent the use of the delegated attributes
by the delegator.
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Authority Pre-Approval Delegation can be pre-approved or optimistic. At the
time a delegator receives a delegation request, it does not necessarily know in ad-
vance whether a particular set of delegated attributes will be useable by the delega-
tee, since it may not have a complete understanding of the current security context
of the delegatee, the current set of attributes of the delegatee, and the policies of the
delegatee’s systems, etc. To avoid making a delegation that will not be honoured,
the delegator could contact the relevant authorisation authorities to ask “if I delegate
these attributes to user X from domain Y, will they be honoured?” But asking this
question in advance for each delegation transaction is inefficient as the authorisation
authority will then need to evaluate the request twice - once for the pre-approval and
once for the actual execution by the delegatee. Therefore, in optimistic delegation,
the delegator agrees to conduct the delegation transaction on the basis of its best
knowledge of the constraints and conditions for the delegation transaction, for ex-
ample, the policies of its systems, the attributes, etc. It does not guarantee that the
delegatee will be able to successfully use this attribute for service invocation.
Type of Credential In general, there are three forms of credentials which are com-
monly used to bear delegation information: X.509, SAML assertion, and generic
token. The generic token is a signed statement that includes the public keys of the
delegator and the delegatee, the involved attributes and a timestamp. Over time, the
delegation credential has become more sophisticated. Currently, most proposals use
the SAML assertion and more popularly X.509-based attribute certificate (such as
in the PRIMA [9] and PERMIS [4] systems) as the means to bear the delegation
credential. It is worthy to note that the generic form of delegation token above can
be only useful in a single delegation transaction. For a multi-step delegation with the
involvement of multiple intermediate entities, it is essential to employ a more com-
plex form of delegation token via a different combination of multiple delegation
tokens.
Key Scheme In general, keys play an important role in securing the exchanged del-
egated attributes between the delegator and the delegatee. Keys are primarily used
to encrypt and sign the delegation tokens. Currently, due to the increasingly popular
and well standardised PKI with X.509 certificate, asymmetric key scheme seems to
be the default option for constructing delegation protocols. However, Varadharajan
suggests that both symmetric key and asymmetric key schemes can be used either
separately or in combination in a hybrid form to support the delegation process
[12, 13]. The symmetric key approach is somewhat similar to the asymmetric key
approach, in that the underlying principle of signing or encrypting the delegation
token is the same. However, in this case, the secret key used to encrypt or sign the
delegation token is assumed to be shared between the delegator and the delegatee
and issued by a trusted third party which can be the system authority.
Where delegation happens? The delegation can happen at multiple levels: system
level and user/application level. At the system level, the delegation is classic in the
sense that the delegation is pre-defined in a concise manner. This type of delegation
is often limited to a set of well studied scenarios. In the system level, delegation
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usually happens as part of the supported access control model, for example, adding
a user to a group in UNIX. Delegation at this level is considered as part of the access
control infrastructure but there is a lack of flexibility to cope with unconventional
scenarios, especially in collaborating activities with external parties. This is where
delegation at the user level can make a difference. Delegation at the user or appli-
cation level is usually ad-hoc in nature and is necessary to address the flexibility
of the access control system. At the user or application level, people may need to
accommodate not only different technical standards but also different workflows,
business processes and frameworks. In this context, delegation is an essential ele-
ment in business processes which require a high level of collaboration. In general,
workflows control the execution of business processes in an organisation at the tech-
nical or information system level [1, 3].
Where is delegation honoured? In general, any access control system is centred
around the following two functions: access decision function and access enforcing
function. Commonly, they are also known as Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Pol-
icy Enforcement Point (PEP) respectively. Therefore, when a request is associated
with a delegation, the validation process can be conducted at: Policy Decision Point
(PDP) with the partial contribution of the PEP or an additional authority which
governs for delegation transactions.
In theory, it is safe to consider the PEP as part of the delegation validation pro-
cess. This is because the PEP is the authority who receives the request from the user
(the requestor). From this point of view, the PEP is the one who is responsible for
receiving the credentials from users and passing them to the PDP for decision mak-
ing. On the other hand, the PDP is responsible for evaluating the policy (also taking
into account the credentials provided by users/subject). Most delegation-supporting
access control models consider the validation process as an additional function of
the PDP.
The second approach is to use an additional authority such as the Credential Val-
idation Service [5] or the Delegation Authority [8] to govern the delegation func-
tion. For example, the Credential Validation Service could be incorporated into the
XACML model. In fact, the PDP is still responsible for decision making. However,
in this approach, the PEP is not the authority to collect and transfer the delegation
credential to the PDP for decision making. This role now belongs to the new delega-
tion authority. In the context of XACML, the delegation authority could also act as a
replacement of the Policy Information Point (PIP). The advantage of this approach
is that systems with existing access control models do not need to change. The only
change is to provide an interface to call and respond to the delegation authority. In
the design of Chadwick et al., the Credential Validation Service could be either an
additional component to be called by the PEP or the PIP [5].
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Table 2 Comparison of some notable delegation approaches using the taxonomy’s characteristics
Characteristics Varadharajan,
Allen & Black’s
Model
PBDM Family Atluri and
Warner’s Model
Gomi et al.’s
Model
Chadwick’s Model
Motivation Lack of authorisa-
tion
Lack of authorisa-
tion
Lack of authorisa-
tion and conflicted
policies
Lack of authorisa-
tion
Lack of authorisa-
tion and conflicted
policies
Delegation Bound-
ary
Within a single do-
main
Within a single do-
main
Within and cross
security domains
Within and cross
security domains
Within and cross
security domains
Who requests dele-
gation?
User User or System au-
thority
Mainly focus on
User level
User User
Who delegates? User User or System au-
thority
User User User
Relationship of the
parties
Both direct and in-
direct
Both direct and in-
direct
Both direct and in-
direct
Both direct and in-
direct
Direct. Indirect
delegation is not
clearly discussed.
What to delegate? Capability or Re-
sponsibility
Capability and Re-
sponsibility
Capability and Re-
sponsibility
Capability and Re-
sponsibility
Capability and Re-
sponsibility
How much to dele-
gate?
Partial or Total Partial or Total Partial or Total Partial or Total Partial delegation
is not specified
How long to dele-
gate?
Temporal or Per-
manent
Temporal or Per-
manent
Temporal or Per-
manent
Temporal or Per-
manent
Temporal or Per-
manent
How to delegate? Grant Grant Grant or Transfer Grant Grant
Authority Pre-
Approval
Yes Not specified Not specified Yes Partially discussed
Type of Credential Generic Token Not specified but
can be any
Not specified but
can be any
X.509, SAML or
Generic token
X.509, SAML or
Generic token
Key Scheme Symmetric or
Asymmetric
Not specified but
can either
Not specified but
can either
Symmetric or
Asymmetric
Symmetric or
Asymmetric
Where delegation
happens?
User level Both but mainly
target the System
level
User level User level User level
Where delegation
is honoured?
Not specified Not specified A central authority
based on RBAC
An additional com-
ponent called Del-
egation Authority
An additional com-
ponent called Cre-
dential Validation
Service
3 Some Approaches to Delegation Problem and Classifications
In this section, the taxonomy criteria are utilised to compare some notable delegation
approaches. For brevity, this paper does not discuss in detail each approach, but
instead gives a brief discussion about the notable features and characteristics of
each approach based on the taxonomy dimensions presented in Table 2.
Varadharajan, Allen and Black’s work in 1991 discussed in detail how a proto-
col for delegation should be structured [13]. Based on the taxonomy, it can be said
that the model of Varadharajan, Allen and Black is specifically designed to sup-
port both key schemes. From delegation perspective, the work, via the delegation of
privilege, does not clearly explain the objective of the delegation process (capabil-
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ity or responsibility). It also fails to explicitly discuss the relationship of delegator
and delegatee. While the protocol has the potential to extend to cover cross domain
transactions, it does not cover this issue in detail.
Zhang, Oh and Sandhu presented a new permission-based delegation model
(PBDM) in 2003 [15]. This model fully supports user to user, temporal, partial and
multi-step delegation. This model is later extended and presented in three variants
called PBDM0, PBDM1 and PBDM2. The PDBM family can support multi-step
delegation, but they neither support constraints in delegation, nor delegation across
multiple security domains [6]. In this model, both types of grant and transfer del-
egation are supported. The PBDM family can be considered as an extension of the
RBDM [2] and RDM [14] models.
In 2005, in an effort to address constraint issues in delegation, Atluri and Warner
[1] studied delegation in the workflow context and introduced a conditional delega-
tion model. This is an interesting delegation approach as it investigates the problem
of delegation with an ad-hoc nature. This is also one of the first models that details
how delegation should be handled at the user level and how/where the delegation
should be honoured. This model is one of the pioneers in the field that address the
issue of delegation in the workflow context. However, similar to previous models,
this work also fails to discuss the relationships between the delegator, the delegatee
and the service provider.
Gomi et al. presented a basic framework to conduct grant delegation and revo-
cation of access privileges across security domains. The model of Gomi et al. [8]
requires the delegator to request the delegation assertion via an additional author-
ity called Delegation Authority (DA). This model lacks the capability to check for
constraints and resolve conflicts between delegated privileges and between the del-
egated privileges with the involved policies. Therefore, it can cause problems in
indirect delegation which happens across multiple security domains. The issue of
authority pre-approval in the delegation process is partially discussed via the ap-
pearance of the delegation authority.
As part of efforts to develop PERMIS, Chadwick et al. proposed a mechanism
based on the XACML conceptual and data flow models to address the issue of dy-
namic delegation of authority which involves the issuing of credentials from one
user to another (user delegation) [5]. They proposed a new conceptual entity called
the Credential Validation Service, to work alongside the PDP in making authori-
sation decisions. The model does not support indirect delegation well. Similarly
to Gomi et al.’s work, this model, via the Credential Validation Service, partially
discusses the issue of authority pre-approval but does not explicitly describe how
delegation can happen without the pre-approval.
4 Discussion
To date, most delegation models have been centralised and based on the RBAC
model. Delegation of capabilities seems to be a major concern of most models, ex-
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cept for some recent delegation models for workflow such as the works of Atluri and
Warner, Gomi et al. and Chadwick et al. Most models have problems with partial
and user (ad-hoc) delegation. It is also worth noting that, until 2004, most published
works regarding delegation focused primarily on delegation between entities within
a single security domain. More recently, there has been a trend toward increasing fo-
cus on cross domain issues. It can be seen that most recently developed models such
as Atluri and Warner, Gomi et al., Chadwick et al., etc. are purposefully designed to
support cross domain delegation.
Cross domain delegation is designed to achieve flexibility to meet the demand
of collaborative activities. However, it is much more complicated to implement and
enforce constraints over the ad-hoc delegation in cross domain models (Chadwick
et al. vs. Varadharajan, Allen and Black). In addition to the same issues of clas-
sic delegation (within a single domain), the complexity of protocol and policy is
a paramount issue. Such complexity requires a very well designed protocol and a
high level of agreement between systems. To achieve cross domain delegation, the
involved authority must also take into account the distribution of applicable policies
across various security domains. For example, if the delegatee, the delegator and the
service provider reside on three different security domains, all policy sets of these
three domains must be considered and fed to the authority in charge of the delega-
tion process for any decision making. This process is quite simple in single-domain
delegation as there is only one single authority to handle the storage of credentials
and feed them to the access decision authority. However, in addition to the distri-
bution of policy, credential and delegation information are also distributed in cross
domain delegation. The typical scenario is that the delegator and its local authority
store and maintain part of the delegation information related to the delegator while
the delegatee and the authority of the delegatee’s domain store and maintain the rest.
It is important to note that the main characteristics of delegation, such as delegation
boundary, where delegation happens and where delegation is honoured, have a sig-
nificant impact on making design decisions. This is because these factors are vital
to form the backbone for a flexible and scalable cross domain delegation solution.
Together with the current trend in supporting cross domain collaborating activ-
ities, it is also important to note that there is an increasing demand in providing
context-aware information to accommodate constraints and commitments for the
delegation process. As current role-based approaches use the relationship of user-
role-permission to impose constraints, it is difficult to present the additional context
information to the access decision authority. Thus, there is a demand for a more ex-
pressive approach than the current role-based mechanisms. This is the reason why
recent approaches such as Chadwick et al. (using XACML) or Gomi et al. (using
SAML), etc. have adopted the policy language-based approach. With well defined
languages such as XACML, SAML, etc., these models show that they can better ad-
dress the issue of constraints. Even though policy language-based communication
is exposed to high overhead and may result in low performance, this may be the
only feasible approach to address the needs of highly collaborative activities across
multiple security domains where constraints and context-awareness are critical. De-
pending on the level of application of a policy language-based approach, each model
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achieves a different level of expressiveness. The positive effects of applying the pol-
icy language-based approach can be seen clearly in Chadwick et al.’s model against
the classic role-based approach in PBDM or RBDM family. However, application
of a policy language is not the sole factor that determines the usefulness of a model
because there are other factors that affect the final outcomes such as how the lan-
guage is implemented, to what extent the language is implemented, the power of the
language itself, etc.
5 Conclusion
This paper discussed the concept of delegation via a number of dimensions and pre-
sented a taxonomy of delegation concepts in the context of information systems and
applied it to several delegation proposals. The taxonomy can be used to understand
the major focus of a particular delegation approach by observing the characteris-
tics involved. The taxonomy can help raise awareness of various design settings and
potential implications on existing access control infrastructures.
Therefore, it can be said that this study is significant for several reasons. First of
all, with the emerging demands in federating multiple enterprise systems together
to achieve complex and collaborative activities, delegation is becoming a common
approach to provide dynamic and flexible access control decisions. Secondly, dele-
gation is considered a comparatively new research area and requires more input from
the academic and industrial community and, although recent research has addressed
the problems, several issues still remain to be investigated and resolved. Therefore,
this research should provide system designers a clear picture about the characteris-
tics of different types of delegation approaches and the involved actors so that they
can choose the type of delegation that best satisfies their requirements. Thirdly, as
collaboration environments require a great level of interoperability, knowledge of
characteristics and protocols of different types of delegation could vastly improve
the integration process.
Finally, as the main focus of this paper is delegation approaches which can be
used in secured task distribution in workflow or secure ad-hoc collaboration, cur-
rently, this paper does not cover the complete set of delegation approaches with the
ad-hoc nature that can be applied highly dynamic and ad-hoc transaction such as se-
cure task distribution in workflow or secure collaboration. Therefore, as the future
work, some other aspects of delegation will be considered such as the rubric of trust
management, logic-based and cryptographic approaches.
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